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1. Introduction
This brief paper is an elaboration on one section of Bezuidenhout 
(forthcoming).1 In the longer paper, I explore the relation between two 
conceptions of context, namely the psychologistic notion of a cognitive 
environment (CE) that belongs to the Relevance Theory (RT) frame-
work and the formal notion of an index that belongs to the traditional 
Twentieth-century philosophy of language framework. The purpose of 
the longer paper is to argue that the RT notion is better able than the 
formal notion to handle some problem cases involving the use of indexi-
cals that have been thought to put pressure on the formal notion of con-
text. In order to make my case, I had to address the question as to the 
nature of and the constraints on CEs—that is, contexts in the RT sense. 
It is this section of the longer paper that I will focus on here, in the 
hopes that I can say a little more about the notion of “conversational 
tailoring” that is central to my account of how CEs are constrained.
1 The longer paper, Bezuidenhout (forthcoming), was presented at a conference 
on Philosophy of Language and Linguistics, held at the Interuniversity Center, 
Dubrovnik, Croatia, September 8–12, 2014. I thank the conference participants, and 
especially Deirdre Wilson and Karen Lewis, for comments on that longer paper, 
some of which are relevant to this shorter paper, too.
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2. What are CEs and how are they constrained?
A person’s CE consists of all the information that is manifest to that 
individual at a time. Information is manifest if it is either currently ex-
plicitly represented in the individual’s working memory (WM) or could 
be so represented, under appropriate conditions. Sperber and Wilson 
(1986: 39) add that, at the time of representation, the person must ac-
cept the information as true or probably true. In a more recent account, 
Sperber and Wilson (2014) say that information in a CE is more or less 
manifest depending on the degree of salience of that information and 
its degree of probability. A CE can thus be pictured as a fi eld of rep-
resented or representable information where the manifestness of that 
information increases along two orthogonal dimensions, as illustrated 
in Figure 1 below:
Figure 1: Degrees of manifestness of information in a CE
Note that there are two distinct ways in which the term ‘manifestness’ 
is being used above. In the fi rst sense, the manifestness of a piece of 
information is a matter of being currently represented or representable 
in the WM of some individual communicator. In this sense manifest-
ness is an all-or-nothing matter. Either information can be so repre-
sented in WM or it cannot. In the second sense, the manifestness of a 
piece of information is a matter of degree, depending as it does on the 
degree of salience that information has for an individual communicator 
and on the degree of probability that the communicator assigns to that 
information. The notion of manifestness in the sense of ‘being salient’ 
or ‘being probable’ is a graded notion, as information can be more or 
less probable/salient. For example, the fi rmer one’s conviction or the 
better evidence one has, the more manifest (because the more prob-
able) that information will be to you. Clark (2013: 114–116) compares 
hearing the sounds of rain to actually seeing the rain and says that in 
the latter circumstance the information that it is raining will be more 
manifest to you.2
2 Note that Clark is comparing the degrees of manifestness of bits of information 
across times or across possible situations, assuming that a bit of information (e.g., that 
it is raining) can be more manifest than that same information is to you at an earlier/
later time or than it would be under different conditions. This entails comparing 
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It might seem strange to have a term ‘manifestness’ that can be un-
derstood as referring both to an all-or-nothing concept and to a concept 
that admits of degrees. I agree it would be most perspicuous to have 
two separate terms for these two notions. So I try below to use the term 
‘representability’ for the all-or-nothing concept and reserve ‘manifest-
ness’ for the graded notion and as a cover term for the dual dimensions 
of salience and probability. However, I do want to note that there are 
other terms in English that have a similar ambiguity. The term ‘visible’ 
is such a term. For example, a road sign partially obscured by trees 
and bushes at the side of the road is less visible than that sign after 
the trees and bushes have been trimmed back. Similarly, the features 
of someone’s face are less visible from a distance than up close. But if 
these facial features are indeed visible to you, then you can perceptu-
ally represent those features, and this applies in both the close-up and 
the distant situations. In this latter sense, visibility is an all or nothing 
matter. You either can or cannot perceptually represent the features. 
What is a matter of degree is the fi delity and vividness of your repre-
sentation. In the close-up situation your percept is likely to be more 
faithful to the original than in the distant situation and have more 
phenomenal details fi lled in.
As noted above, information is manifest (in the all-or-nothing sense) 
if it is either currently represented in WM or could be so represented, 
under appropriate conditions. The issue now is what should be allowed 
to count as an “appropriate” condition. If we allow these conditions to 
be unconstrained, then almost any piece of information would turn out 
to be manifest to you, given that there is undoubtedly some condition or 
another under which you would be able to represent that information. 
For instance, you could explicitly represent arcane facts about quasars, 
if you were fi rst to undergo graduate training in astrophysics. Clearly, 
we do not want to allow conditions like this, as we do not want to say 
that these arcane facts are currently manifest to you.
What is manifest to you now is constrained by what you actually 
already know—by your current store of encyclopedic knowledge. Some-
thing that you already know in this sense could be activated in WM and 
thus is a part of your current CE. We also want to allow that informa-
tion in your current physical environment is manifest if, via the redi-
rection of attentional resources and the (normal) operation of one or 
a bit of information represented in an individual’s CE with a bit of information 
represented in another (earlier, later, counterfactual, or possible) CE of that same 
individual. In a more full-fl edged account of CEs, it would be important to add such a 
dynamic component into the overall account. However, note that, in Figure 1, bits of 
representable information are pictured as points in a two-dimensional “fi eld” that is 
the CE of an individual at a particular time and in a particular situation. The degree 
of manifestness of a bit of information is represented as distance from the probability/
salience maxima. Figure 1 is too schematic in another way as well; we presumably 
would want to allow that two distinct bits of information that are represented in an 
individual’s CE can have exactly the same degree of manifestness.
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more of your sensory organs, you would become sensorily aware of this 
information. For example, the hum of the refrigerator in your apart-
ment is manifest to you right now because even though you aren’t pay-
ing attention to that hum, you would become aware of it if you directed 
your hearing towards the part of the room where your fridge is located. 
In addition, information about your interlocutors’ informative and com-
municative intentions, their preferences and abilities, as well as socio-
cultural information about them (e.g., facts about their social status) 
will be manifest to you in virtue of your “mind-reading” skills. Finally, 
interlocutors generally need to keep track of what has transpired so far 
in the conversation, and thus linguistic information at various levels 
(e.g., phonological, semantic, and pragmatic) will be manifest to you 
(and of course it will need to be mutually manifest to all the interlocu-
tors in the particular conversational situation if communication in that 
situation is to succeed). In sum, what is manifest includes encyclopedic, 
situational, social and linguistic information.
However, even this is still too broad, as we do not want to say that 
everything you know at a particular time is a part of the CE used to 
understand an utterance by one of your conversational partners at that 
time. In the 1970s, when Chomsky, Fodor and others popularized the 
idea of a modular mind, they argued that modules controlling percep-
tion and the language module (what Hauser et al. (2002) call the lan-
guage faculty narrowly conceived) are encapsulated, in the sense that 
the operations of such modules are sensitive only to domain specifi c 
information written in a proprietary code that is manipulated in ac-
cordance with module-internal rules, but that the central processor is 
unencapsulated, in the sense that any piece of knowledge could become 
relevant for its purposes. This modularist tradition treats pragmatic 
reasoning as a central cognitive process par excellence. 
RT in its earliest iterations embraced the idea of pragmatics as part 
of the central processing system, and of pragmatic inferences as un-
encapsulated. Where Sperber and Wilson (1986) parted company with 
Fodor was that, while Fodor believed there could be no scientifi c ac-
count of central processes, Sperber and Wilson thought it was possible 
to give a scientifi c account of pragmatics, their RT framework being just 
such an account. Sperber and Wilson resisted the idea of a “pragmatics 
module”, I believe, because accounts of pragmatics modules on offer in 
the 1980s appealed to ideas from then existing pragmatic theories (e.g., 
speech act theory, theories of politeness, and theories of turn-taking in 
conversation) and simply assumed that the pragmatic processing mod-
ule (or its sub-modules) operated according to internalized versions 
of these theories.3 RT on the other hand was intended to be a single 
overarching framework to explain all pragmatic processing and as an 
alternative to theories such as Grice’s theory of conversational implica-
ture, Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory, and Searle’s speech act 
3 See Kasher (1984).
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theory. According to Sperber and Wilson, pragmatic reasoning oper-
ates according to cognitive and communicative principles of relevance. 
These principles are conveniently summarized in Wilson and Sperber 
(2012: 6–7):
Cognitive principle of relevance: Human cognition tends to be geared to the 
maximization of relevance.
Communicative principle of relevance: Every act of overt communication 
conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance.
Presumption of optimal relevance: (a) The utterance is relevant enough to 
be worth processing; (b) it is the most relevant one compatible with the com-
municator’s abilities and preferences.
The relevance of an ostensive stimulus—and utterances are paradigm 
examples of such stimuli—is a matter of degree. The greater are the 
cognitive effects of processing a stimulus and the smaller is the cogni-
tive effort needed to process it, the more relevant will that stimulus be 
(Wilson and Sperber 2012: 88). Cognitive effects are modifi cations of 
an individual’s CE. The information carried by the stimulus will either 
combine with existing assumptions to yield a contextual implication 
or will combine with existing information to alter the probability or 
saliency of that information or will interact so as to eliminate or cancel 
existing assumptions (Wilson and Sperber 2012: 176, 200). With re-
spect to the effort factor, Wilson and Sperber mention two things that 
impact it, namely the form in which the stimulus is presented (its audi-
bility, legibility, dialect, register, syntactic form, familiarity, etc.) and 
the degree to which it taxes the resources of memory and imagination 
(Wilson and Sperber 2012: 176).
As I said, initially Sperber and Wilson resisted the idea of a prag-
matics module. In later iterations of RT, however, they became more 
receptive to the idea of a pragmatics module, and suggested it is a spe-
cialized sub-module of the Theory of Mind module (ToMM) that has 
been proposed to explain the human capacity for “mind reading”—in 
the sense of being readily and automatically able to “read” a person’s 
purposive (ostensive) behavior and see it as a manifestation of that 
person’s underlying beliefs, intentions and desires (Wilson and Sperber 
2012: 261–278). Since we want assumptions about interlocutors’ infor-
mative, communicative and referential intentions to be a part of the in-
terlocutors’ CEs and hence part of what is mutually manifest to them, 
we want the output from the ToMM to interact with other information 
in a person’s CE. However, precisely because we need more than ToMM 
output to produce and understand verbal utterances, I would resist the 
idea of a pragmatics module as a sub-module of the ToMM.
Rather than accounting for the constraints on CEs by arguing that 
pragmatics is modular and hence that the information that feeds into 
pragmatic processes is constrained in virtue of being domain specifi c or 
encapsulated, the key to understanding how CEs are constrained is to 
understand the principles according to which CEs are modifi ed in the 
course of conversational exchanges. We saw above that, according to 
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RT, a speaker’s utterance, which is an ostensive stimulus, is intended 
to modify the CEs of the conversational partners. Understanding the 
principles that govern such modifi cations is important for understand-
ing CEs and their role in utterance production and comprehension. The 
attempt to shape one’s interlocutors’ CEs is what I call “conversational 
tailoring”. I have described some aspects of such tailoring in the con-
text of a discussion of generalized conversational implicatures in Be-
zuidenhout (2015) and in the context of a discussion of presuppositions 
in Bezuidenhout (2010, 2014).
Not everything that you know is a part of your current CE and hence 
currently manifest to you. (Moreover, not everything in your current 
CE is currently activated in the “spotlight of attention”. I return to this 
second issue in the following section). What carves out your current CE 
from the totality of what you know? This is just the old “Frame problem” 
raised in early AI research in the 1960s and 1970s. The issue initially 
arose in attempts to account for commonsense reasoning and conscious 
deliberation (including scientifi c theorizing), which modularists such as 
Fodor believed could never be explained scientifi cally. However, many 
of the same issues arise in the context of language performance studies, 
given the crucial role of pragmatic inferences in language performance. 
Such pragmatic processing is equally the target of those who believe 
that non-modular processes are not scientifi cally tractable.
Given how old the frame problem is, I cannot hope to summarize all 
the attempts to answer it here. For current purposes, I need merely to 
invoke the well-entrenched notions of mental frames, scripts, or sche-
mas, which are representations stored in long term memory and that 
contain default information about typical scenarios we have encoun-
tered in the past (e.g., we may have stored a “restaurant” script that 
contains information about the sorts of things that typically transpire 
in a restaurant). When one of these scripts is triggered by the current 
conversational situation, this will already to a large degree shape how 
you will interpret the actors, actions and events that transpire. Simi-
larly, it has been argued that we operate with various sorts of mental 
schemas (or heuristics), such as a causal schema that accounts for our 
tendency to see co-occurring events as causally connected, or a purpo-
sive schema that accounts for our tendency to see events (even natural 
events) as the result of underlying agency or purpose.
These ideas of frames, scripts and schemas certainly explain why 
not everything you know will be invoked in a particular conversational 
situation and how information in your CE might be limited to situ-
ation-specifi c information. However, they don’t explain what invokes 
a particular script or frame in the fi rst place. It is on this issue that I 
think RT has some valuable insights to offer. I will briefl y describe two 
ways in which ideas from RT can explain how particular frames are 
invoked in the course of a conversation and thus explain how interlocu-
tors are able to shape one another’s CEs. 
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Firstly, the very idea that the inferential phase of language com-
prehension is a relevance driven process will partially explain why a 
particular frame is accessed. As we saw above, relevance is a matter 
of balancing contextual effects and processing effort. Degree of effort 
is a factor in determining relevance. Thus the more effort it takes to 
retrieve a frame, the less relevant the stimulus that is interpreted rela-
tive to that frame would be (other things being equal). I assume that 
the processing effort involved in accessing a frame is affected by such 
factors as recency of use, frequency of use, ease of access (e.g., cases of 
self-deception may involve blocking access to certain frames; a mother 
who refuses to read the signs of her son’s drug addiction is mentally 
blocking a way of framing the situation), and so on. And on the fl ip side, 
the more contextual effects that are yielded by invoking a particular 
frame, the more relevant the stimulus that is interpreted relative to 
that frame would be (other things being equal).
Suppose you are dining in a restaurant with a married couple. As 
the meal draws to a close, the husband, gesturing towards his wife, 
suddenly comes out with an utterance of (1):
1. She will pay for it.
You take him to have said that his wife will pay for the meal. After 
all, you are in a restaurant and maybe you have been thinking for a 
while about the touchy issue of who will pick up the tab for the meal. 
So the restaurant script will have been recently activated and be easily 
accessible. Moreover, the utterance interpreted relative to this frame 
answers a question that was on your mind and, you reasonably as-
sume, on the minds of the other diners. That is, interpreted in this way, 
the husband’s utterance is highly relevant, and the relevance driven 
comprehension procedure is likely to halt at this point, without seeking 
alternative possible interpretations.
Of course, it is always possible that the husband has been silently 
fuming all evening about his wife’s infi delity, which he found out about 
just before the start of the dinner when the private detective he had 
hired to follow his wife slipped him a set of photographs of his wife in 
fl agrante delicto. Unable to contain himself anymore, he gives vent to 
his desire for revenge against his wife by uttering (1). In other words, 
in such a situation, interpreting (1) as the claim that the wife will pay 
for the meal would involve some sort of misunderstanding, although 
not one that can be blamed on the interpreters.
This raises an interesting issue that is tangential to my main point, 
namely whether in this situation the husband’s intention to express his 
desire for revenge is the one that fi xes the context for interpretation. 
I will not pursue this issue here. Suffi ce it to say that I follow Bianchi 
(2013), who argues that context-fi xing intentions must be ones that the 
speaker makes available to the hearer, in the sense that in the normal 
course of things a hearer could reasonably be expected to discern these 
intentions. Intentions that are hidden or opaque are not communica-
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tive intentions. The husband had no communicative intentions behind 
his utterance of (1). If the misunderstanding is detected, some conver-
sational repair can be done and the correct frame for interpreting the 
husband’s utterance of (1) can be made accessible to the interlocutors. 
Or the husband might exploit the misunderstanding to cover up his 
embarrassment at showing his emotions in public and let the interpre-
tation that his wife will pay for the dinner stand.
The second RT idea that can help to explain how and when frames, 
scripts or schemas will be invoked is the idea of procedural meaning. 
The idea is that some linguistic expressions encode procedures rather 
than concepts. There may also be expressions that encode both con-
cepts and procedures (see Wilson and Sperber 1993, 2012). The no-
tion of procedural meaning “arises from the observation that there are 
linguistic expressions which can help hearers to follow the [speaker’s] 
intended inferential path” (Clark 2013: 312). Expressions that encode 
procedures are called procedural markers. One important sub-class of 
such markers is the class of discourse connectives, such as ‘but’, ‘how-
ever’, ‘nevertheless’, inferential ‘so’, ‘because’, ‘after all’, ‘moreover’, and 
so on. Many other lexical items and linguistic constructions have been 
said to encode procedural meanings. For example, prosody, syntactic 
structures (e.g., it-clefts), interjections (e.g., ‘wow’ and ‘oh’), illocution-
ary force indicators and hearsay particles have all been taken to encode 
procedures.4
Blakemore (1987: 2002) has discussed discourse markers from an 
RT perspective, treating them as expressions that guide the interfer-
ential phase of interpretation. She argues that they encode rules that 
indicate the type of CE in which the utterances of which they are a part 
are to be processed. In this way they guide the hearer towards intended 
contextual effects and hence reduce the overall effort required to pro-
cess the discourse. As Clark (2013: 310) puts it, procedural expressions 
“guide the hearer by making one of the possible inferential connections 
more salient than others”. Such expressions “indicate the way in which 
the utterance might be relevant and so make particular ways of pro-
cessing more salient” (Clark 2013: 326).
Consider for example a situation in which a speaker utters the se-
quence of sentences in (2) below:
2. He’s a heavy drinker. His wife left him.
There are several possible ways in which these two sentences could 
hang together to create a coherent discourse segment. The speaker 
could intend to convey that the wife’s leaving was a consequence of the 
man’s heavy drinking or that it was a reason for his heavy drinking. Or 
perhaps his heavy drinking and his wife’s leaving are just two of the 
ways in which the man’s life is falling apart. There are undoubtedly 
other possibilities too. Assumptions in the mutual cognitive environ-
4 For further discussion, see Andersen and Fretheim (2000) and Escandell-Vidal 
et al. (2011).
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ment (including the topic currently under discussion, the identity of 
the man, what his relation to the interlocutors is, and so on) may make 
it easy to fi gure out which of these possible relations between the two 
events is the one that the speaker intends to be talking about. How-
ever, there are ways for the speaker to make it easier on the listeners 
by using a discourse connective, such as in (3)–(5) below:
3. He’s a heavy drinker, so his wife left him.
4. He’s a heavy drinker because his wife left him.
5. He’s a heavy drinker. Moreover, his wife left him.
In the case of (3), one is constrained to interpret the man’s drinking 
as the reason for the wife’s leaving rather than the other way about. 
In the case of (4), the inferential connection is just the reverse. In both 
these cases, certain types of scripts or frames are likely to be invoked. 
In the case of (3), a script about how alcoholic men behave in domestic 
situations might lead one to infer that the man physically abused his 
wife while under the infl uence of alcohol. In the case of (4), a script 
about how a man scorned by his love would act might lead one to infer 
that the man sought solace in his local pub night after night and be-
came addicted to alcohol. In the case of (5), a script about people down 
and out on their luck might lead one to infer that the man has experi-
enced further woes beyond his alcoholism and having been deserted by 
his spouse, such as having huge debts, and so on. 
There is a lot more that could be said about the notion of procedural 
meaning, about procedural markers, and about discourse markers in 
particular. There is an extensive literature devoted to all these issues. 
For current purposes, the main point I wish to emphasize is that proce-
dural markers can help us understand how particular frames, scripts 
and schemas can be invoked in the course of an unfolding conversation. 
Procedural markers are used as a way to shape the CEs of one’s inter-
locutors. They are devices for conversational tailoring.
3. CEs and the center of attention
In the previous section I invoked the well-entrenched notion of a frame, 
script or schema as a way of explaining how CEs are constrained and 
then invoked notions from RT (in particular the ideas of relevance-driv-
en processing and of procedural meaning) to answer the antecedent 
question as to how particular frames/scripts/schemas are invoked in 
particular situations. I suggested that by constraining one another’s 
CEs in these ways, interlocutors are engaging in conversational tailor-
ing. In this section I address a second way in which people engage in 
conversational tailoring. Once having invoked a particular frame, and 
thereby having made certain information manifest, there is a further 
question as to which bits of information in the frame are currently ac-
tivated and at the center of attention. This too requires conversational 
tailoring.
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Although the idea of a bit of information coming to be at the center 
of attention may seem a simple process, I believe that it is in fact a 
rather complex matter with multiple dimensions. One way to charac-
terize the process is to think of it as a matter of foregrounding some 
bit of information in one’s CE, which of course presupposes that other 
information remains backgrounded. The backgrounded information 
functions partly in an identifi catory role, helping to pick out what is at 
issue (just as something stands out as a fi gure only relative to a par-
ticular sort of ground). Much of what has been treated in the literature 
as presupposed information could be re-construed as backgounded in-
formation. Here I follow Abbott (2000). Thus, the means available to in-
terlocutors to background certain information and, by contrast, to put 
other information at the center of attention, are just the sorts of devices 
that have been much discussed in the literature of presupposition. I 
can’t summarize that huge literature here. Bezuidenhout (2010, 2014) 
makes a start at showing how presupposition triggers can be thought of 
as devices for separating the foreground from the background. 
I will give just one very simplistic illustration here. In the presuppo-
sition literature, defi nite descriptions are frequently treated as presup-
position triggers. Thus an utterance of a sentence containing a descrip-
tion of the form ‘The F’ is said to presuppose the existence of a salient 
and identifi able F.5 So consider (6) below:
6. The man in the red shirt looks like he might be able to help us.
Suppose I utter this to you at the entrance to a nightclub in Seoul 
where we have stopped because we have lost our way. The man at the 
entrance is checking people’s IDs as they enter the club and let us sup-
pose that he is in fact wearing a white shirt. I do not realize that he is 
standing under a red light that makes his shirt look red from my per-
spective. The presupposed information that there is a salient and iden-
tifi able man in a red shirt is intended to help you identify the man who 
could help us. Since this information is part of the background that is 
intended to bring a particular individual to the fore, it does not matter 
that the information is incorrect, so long as it plays the intended role.6 
It will do this if you are subject to the same visual illusion that I am 
subject to or if you can see that that from my point of view what is in 
fact white would look red and make adjustments accordingly.
The use of defi nite descriptions for this sort of identifi catory role is 
one of the most straightforward ways in which backgrounded (= pre-
5 Here I follow Beaver and Geurts (2014). For instance, they say and I agree 
that an utterance of ‘It was the knave who stole the tarts’ presupposes at least 
the following: There is a (salient and identifi able) knave. There were (salient and 
identifi able) tarts. Somebody stole the tarts. The it-cleft construction is another type 
of presupposition trigger that I do not discuss in the text above.
6 Note that it is not the fl esh and blood individual that is “brought to the fore” 
or “placed at the center of attention”. Rather it is a representation of that individual 
that is centered. What is centered is an element of a person’s cognitive environment 
(CE) and a CE is a mental construct.
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supposed) information helps put something at the center of attention. 
In a more extended treatment I would hope to show that this applies 
to many other sorts of presupposition triggers too, including grammati-
cal devices such as it-clefts and right- and left-dislocations, phonologi-
cal devices such as pitch accents and information contours, and many 
other such linguistic and paralinguistic means that we have for infor-
mation structuring purposes.
4. Conclusions
I have laid out some of the details of the psychological notion of con-
text assumed within the RT framework, namely the notion of context 
as the mutual cognitive environments (CEs) of the conversational par-
ticipants. I have also tried to show how the ideas of relevance-driven 
processing and of procedural meaning can help us to explain the ways 
in which CEs are constrained in the course of language production 
and understanding, because they help to explain how in the course of 
language production and comprehension particular frames, scripts, or 
schemas are invoked. I then very briefl y mentioned some ideas about 
how information in a CE gets to be at the center of attention. These 
ideas of framing and centering help us to see some of the ways in which 
interlocutors are continually engaged in a process of conversational tai-
loring as a conversation unfolds.
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